Law, Language, and Control: China’s Ethnic Unity and Progress Law in Context

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On March 12, 2026, China passed the “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” during the fourth session of the fourteenth National People’s Congress, poised to take effect in July of 2026. In recent years, China has come under international scrutiny for alleged crimes against humanity, primarily due to its  detention of more than one million Uyghurs in re-education camps. Although the Han ethnic group makes up more than 90% of China’s population of 1.4 billion, China still recognizes 55 other ethnic groups, totalling nearly 125 million people. These groups mostly inhabit semi-autonomous regions in China’s West such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. More than its direct tactics of assimilative force, though, Beijing has also propelled the cultural dilution of ethnic minorities through policies since Xi Jinping’s ascension in 2012 such as the implementation of the Xinjiang De-extremification Regulation or the rollout of pervasive surveillance systems tied to the Integrated Joint Operations Platform. This new policy, however, represents a climax which codifies Beijing’s longstanding efforts to forge ethnic unity under the Communist Party into law. 

The new law specifically targets language and children’s education as points of reform. It mandates instruction in Mandarin Chinese before kindergarten and declares Mandarin Chinese the official language for instruction at pre-schools and primary education institutions. Though over three hundred languages and hundreds of regional dialects are spoken in China, Mandarin Chinese is the official language of the Chinese Communist Party and is based on the Beijing dialect. Schools must teach their students Beijing’s perspectives on the state, history, nation, culture, and religion and educate them on Party doctrine. Article 20 even compels parents to perform family education responsibilities in accordance with the law, bringing the Party’s reach into the household. Despite the law's claims to uphold its protection of minority linguistic rights, Beijing’s main agenda is clearly linguistic integration and the erasure of minority languages.  

China’s repression of minority rights is problematic from a legal point of view because it opposes international law and contradicts its own pre-existing legal framework. Article 27 of ICCPR of international law claims that “in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,” like China, “persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” Citing language erasure as genocide, the United Nations has historically denounced China’s complicity to colonial boarding schools in Tibet and its active suppression of protest in Mongolia in 2020 after the Communist Party replaced Mongolian textbooks with those written in Mandarin. 

China’s own constitution—under General Principles Article 4— promises that “all ethnic groups shall have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages.” A 1984 law on regional and national autonomy promotes the use of minority languages in schools, though accompanied by Mandarin Chinese. This law even permitted schools with minority students to have textbooks in their respective languages. Beyond the Ethnic Unity law’s clear violation of international law, China’s sudden departure from the provisions of the 1984 Ethnic Unity law complicates the credibility of its pledge to ethnic harmony and exposes a widening gap between its constitutional guarantees and its current policy direction. 

Not only does the law approach cultural-ethnic unity through language restrictions and education reform, but it also encourages cultural blending between ethnic minorities and the Han. For example, the law seeks to break-up minority heavy neighborhoods and promotes migration out of regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities in order to blend urban and rural communities. Moreover, under Article 40, the law protects cross-ethnic marriages, making it illegal to oppose marriage on ethnic or religious grounds.

Another complication of the law is its assertive, yet vague language pertaining to legal responsibility. Article 63 stipulates that “organizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the P.R.C. that commit acts aimed at the P.R.C. that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law.” This legal requirement, to prosecute people or organizations outside of China if their actions harm internal ethnic unity, is another example of China’s increased transnational repression. According to the ‘protective principle’ in international law, extraterritorial jurisdiction is only applicable in cases of national security. However, the absence of precise legal definitions for “ethnic unity” creates an expectation of broad interpretation in which criticism, academic research, journalism, or even advocacy for minority rights could be construed as threats to national unity. This ambiguity raises serious concerns about selective enforcement and due process, as individuals and organizations may be subject to punishment without clear standards of legality.

For 125 million, the “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” formalizes China’s shift toward enforced cultural and linguistic assimilation while undermining both international norms and its own prior legal commitments. Its vague provisions and expansive reach not only threaten minority rights and legal clarity, but also extend state control beyond its borders, raising serious uncertainty about future justice and a potential global legal conflict.

Luca Raffa is a sophomore at Brown University studying History. He is a writer for Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at luca_raffa@brown.edu.

Danny Moylan is a sophomore from Massachusetts studying Political Science and International/Public Affairs. He is a Staff Editor and Blog Director for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at daniel_moylan@brown.edu.