The End of Chevron and the Reallocation of Interpretive Power

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In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and in doing so, it reshaped the entire structure of American governance. For four decades, Chevron deference required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Chevron was framed as a doctrine of interpretation; however, in practice, the doctrine was something vastly more profound: a structural reallocation of interpretive authority within the federal government.

In 2024, the Court overturned Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The majority opinion framed its decision as a restoration of the judiciary’s inherent duty to “say what the law is.” Yet, if Chevron was not only an interpretive doctrine but also a constitutional settlement, its demise raises a plethora of much deeper questions. The Court has not only adjusted a doctrine; it has unsettled the balance of interpretation across Congress, agencies, and the judiciary, whilst failing to clearly articulate what replaces it. Within this moment, a structural analysis is necessary. 

The two-step framework of Chevron is well known: first, determine whether or not Congress has clearly spoken on the issue. If not, then the court defers to any reasonable agency interpretation regarding the statute. This doctrine rested on implied congressional delegation. When statutes were determined to be ambiguous, the courts were to assume Congress intended for agencies to fill the gaps.

Modern governance depends on broad statutory schemes administered primarily by expert agencies. Congress, by design, legislates at a high level of generality. Agencies then take this legislation and operationalize it through rulemaking and adjudication. In the same process, courts ensure legality and procedural fairness. Chevron recognized this arrangement and solidified it. It saw that ambiguity within ever-complex regulation was inevitable and that politically accountable agencies were better suited institutionally than courts to resolve policy-bound interpretative issues. 

In this way, Chevron redistributed the interpretive authority. It did not eliminate judicial review; instead, it bound it. Courts retained their authority to ensure policy clarity in statutes and reasonableness. But within statutory ambiguity, agencies held the primary interpretive authority. The allocation was not textual in the Constitution. But it reflects a pragmatic settlement between Articles I, II, and III in the broader context of the administrative state. 

The demise of Chevron rests on a different constitutional interpretation: that interpretation itself is the core function of Article III courts. This formulation, drawn from Marbury v. Madison, asserts that it is emphatically the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. From this perspective, Chevron is an anomaly. If statutory interpretation is a law declaration, and law declaration is a judicial power, then mandatory deference is purely an abdication of its constitutional duty. But this view oversimplifies the structural reality of the situation.

Statutory ambiguity often conceals policy discretion. When Congress uses terms such as “reasonable,” “appropriate,” and “public interest,” it does not expect courts to impose a singular meaning from a different regulatory context. Agencies thus exercise delegated authority simply because policymaking requires their expertise, flexibility, and responsiveness.

Chevron reflected a recognition that “saying what the law is” in modern regulatory practices often entails value judgments deeply embedded in administrative governance. By deferring within ambiguity, courts acknowledge that not all interpretations are purely judicial in nature.

Overruling Chevron reasserts the authority of Article III, but it also vastly expands the authority of the judiciary. Courts now find themselves independently responsible for resolving ambiguities across vast regulatory modes. The central question is whether this then restores constitutional equilibrium or instead reassigns policymaking from agencies to judges.

The fall of Chevron did not occur in isolation. In recent years, the Court has invoked the Major Questions Doctrine to require clear congressional authorization for agency actions of vast economic or political significance. This doctrine signaled skepticism toward broad agency interpretive authority. Chevron’s elimination suggests a larger movement toward judicial supremacy in statutory interpretation, specifically in politically salient domains. Whether this development strengthens the rule of law or risks the broader entrenchment of judicial policymaking is an open question.

What remains clear is that SCOTUS has not replaced Chevron with a comprehensive structure for the administrative state. It has rejected deference without fully articulating how modern governance should allocate interpretive responsibilities. If Chevron represented a functional constitutional settlement, its demise is not the end of a doctrine. It is the beginning of a renegotiation over the future allocation of interpretive powers within the American government.

Hayden Hradek is a freshman from the Ozarks of southwest Missouri studying International and Public Affairs and Social Analysis and Research. He is a staff writer for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at hayden_hradek@brown.edu.

Michaela Hanson is a sophomore at Brown University studying English and Economics. She is an Associate Editor for the Brown University Law Review blog, and can be reached at michaela_hanson@brown.edu. 

Aidan Fogarty is a sophomore concentrating in International and Public Affairs. He is a staff editor for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at aidan_fogarty@brown.edu.