Drawing the Line: Citizenship, Identity, and Belonging in Modern Italy

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The Italian government enacted law no. 91 of February 1992 primarily to accommodate dual citizenship. As a result, this law effectively eliminated a former rule that automatically deprived an individual of Italian citizenship when they were naturalized in another country and established principles regarding the acquisition of Italian citizenship. Beyond citizenship acquired through marriage and civil union or the process of naturalization, ius sangunis (i.e., citizenship by blood) and ius solis (i.e., citizenship by place of birth) were two core principles which have driven the emerging debate about who is and who should be eligible to become an Italian citizen. The establishment, interpretations, and amendments of the laws governing Italian citizenship ultimately seek to define a more and more complex ambiguity of Italian identity. 

Already in place since Italian unification in 1861, and long-prevailing in European societies, ius sangunis determines an individual’s citizenship as either that of their parents or citizenship transferred by inheritance. Ius sangunis in Italy grants citizenship by descent to any child born to an Italian father or mother, according to the principle of gender equality given by status civitatis. Not only is this law applicable to those born and living in Italy to Italian citizens, but those of Italian heritage from across the global Italian diaspora can also become Italian citizens by tracing their lineages and proving their ties to an Italian ancestor. 

An exodus of emigrants from an impoverished Italy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to the rise of a significant Italian diaspora in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. With the availability of increasingly more affordable transatlantic transportation in the late 1800s, a peasant class largely from southern Italy and Sicily escaped social chaos fueled by widespread poverty, natural disasters, and epidemics that Italy’s fledgling government failed to mitigate. By 1920, nearly four million of these farmworkers and laborers immigrated to the United States alone in search of steady work. A second wave of Italian emigrants emerged in the 1950s after WWII caused Italy’s economy to collapse, as Italians looked again across the Atlantic for work opportunities. During the last decade, tens of thousands of these immigrants’ descendants in South America in particular have filed for Italian citizenship. In 2024, Italy granted citizenship to 30,000 Argentinians and 20,000 Brazilians coveting the Italian passport, whose power would allow South Americans to seek out work abroad in EU member states and even the United States as a result of an unyielding economic landscape in their respective countries of origin. 

However, the masses of certificate requests needed to prove Italian ancestry have clogged Italian town halls and churches with physical paperwork while actual requests for Italian citizenship have congested Italian courts; in order to curb such requests, the Italian government issued a circular in October 2024 to deny citizenship of applicants whose Italian ancestors were naturalized as foreign citizens while the applicant themself was a minor, breaking the line of citizenship transmission. This memorandum has consequently excluded many of the Italian diaspora from Italian citizenship and its associated rights and privileges, including the ability to live, work, and study in any EU member state.

Still, many Italian descendants have continued to acquire their Italian citizenship. In December 2024, Javier Milei-- Argentina’s current president-- became the newest member of over 900,000 Italian citizens residing in Argentina, though his acquisition of Italian citizenship prompted outrage amongst Italians of the “seconda generazione,” their advocates, and their sympathizers. According to the 1992 law, ius solis authorizes the children of immigrants born on Italian territory to become Italian citizens. But the pathways towards Italian citizenship through ius solis is not straightforward as it seems. 

Italian birthright citizenship pertains exclusively to those born to non-Italians on Italian soil, and these hundreds of thousands of individuals must wait until they are eighteen years of age to apply for Italian citizenship under the condition that they can prove uninterrupted residence in Italy. Unlike the United States, Italy does not grant birthright citizenship for all and does not grant citizenship at the time of birth. Furthermore, those of the “second generation” must apply for citizenship within one year and face many bureaucratic obstacles, which often dissuade or even prevent many from becoming Italian citizens. In short, ius solis still restricts a significant number of Italians on Italian soil deserving of citizenship from attaining the associated rights and privileges, excluding them from an Italian identity. 

Indeed, policy-makers in Italy have tabled an alternative: ius scholae. This principle has resurfaced many times in the last decade and would ultimately allow immigrant children born or raised in Italy  to acquire citizenship within five years of attending school in Italy. Many Italians see schooling as a fundamental means by which all members of Italian society become true, integrated citizens: proponents of this principle argue that those learning Italy’s language, history, and values merit inclusion in the Italian community. The nearly 600,000 children born to immigrants who attend Italian schools would be ius scholae’s primary beneficiaries. Italy’s right-leaning government, nevertheless, has rejected this proposal and its potential promises on multiple occasions. 

Not only have members of the Italian diaspora and those of the seconda generazione faced exclusive barriers to Italian citizenship, but immigrants in Italy seeking to naturalize have likewise faced setbacks. The prevailing law for naturalization requires most foreigners applying for citizenship to reside in Italy for at least ten years. A recent referendum in June 2025 sought to ease these restrictions by lowering the minimum number of years of Italian residency from ten to five; however, with little bipartisan support from center-right and center-left coalitions as well as low voter turnout, it failed to pass. In fact, Italy’s right-wing prime minister Giorgia Meloni abstained from voting in this referendum in protest against an easier path towards citizenship. Despite this setback, the referendum brought the issue of acquiring citizenship to the mainstream conversation, highlighting challenges faced by thousands of foreigners who seek to be integrated into Italian society. 

Like Italy, the United States has brought American citizenship into question when President Trump signed an executive order nullifying birthright citizenship in January 2025. This attack on birthright citizenship reflects the administration's desire to other the children of undocumented immigrants and temporary foreign residents, demonstrated also by its crackdown on the US-Mexico border. Regardless, these recent global trends have fostered increasing dialogue about citizenship laws and identity. Who gets to be an Italian? Who gets to be an American? Who is included, and who is excluded? Why? As society confronts these questions, so will a more distinct vision of national identity and values emerge. 

Luca Raffa is a sophomore at Brown University studying History. He is a writer for Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at luca_raffa@brown.edu.  

Daniel Shin is a junior at Brown University studying Economics and International and Public Affairs. He is an editor for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at sangjun_shin@brown.edu.
Wesley Horn is a sophomore at Brown University studying History and Economics. He is an Associate Editor for the Brown University Law Review blog, and can be reached at wesley_horn@brown.edu.