Beyond Trump: Justice Amy Coney Barrett and the Boundaries of Presidential Influence

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What followed the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg can only be defined as political chaos. Confirmed just eight days before the 2020 presidential election, Justice Amy Coney Barrett was perceived as the capstone of President Donald Trump’s efforts to secure a conservative supermajority on the Supreme Court.

Yet, at the time of writing this article, ACB sits four years into her tenure with the aforementioned narrative looking alarmingly incomplete. Barrett is still a conservative by judicial philosophy, but her opinions peel back layers of a form of conservatism distinct from that of Trump-era politics. Specifically, Barrett’s opinions of justice are rooted in institutional restraint, procedural fidelity, and a concern for maintaining the Court’s legitimacy. This emerging independence underscores a broader truth of the judiciary: presidential influence over the Supreme Court is vastly more limited than political narratives suggest. Through a glimpse into Justice Barrett’s jurisdictional evolution, a glimpse into “conservatism's” shifting definition within the broader context of the American legal tradition can be had.

The nomination of Barrett herself was crafted out of urgency. Following Justice Ginsburg’s death, Senate Republicans moved with unprecedented speed to confirm her before the 2020 presidential election, despite having blocked the nomination of Merrick Garland by President Barack Obama under similar circumstances back in 2016. The message of Republicans was clear: ideology and power, not procedural oversight, guided the process.

Now, the rushed process does not mean she lacked experience for the job; in fact, her intellectual credentials were impeccable. A former clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia (who himself towers as an institutional conservative) and a respected professor of law at Notre Dame, Barrett’s journey to the Court established her originalist and textualist views. But the story of Barrett’s first few years has proven exponentially more complicated than that.

Barrett’s record so far has revealed a consistent judicial conservatism–but one that proves to be more institutional rather than ideological. Her approach to cases often favors narrow rulings, rigor in procedures, and the preservation of the Court’s legitimacy over any sweeping doctrinal changes. Several major cases from her time on the bench so far illustrate this pattern in her ideology.

In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, decided in 2021, the Court considered whether or not Philadelphia had violated the First Amendment through the refusal to contract with a Catholic foster agency that refused to work with same-sex couples. Now, while the unanimous decision favored the Catholic agency, reasoning was carefully restrained. Barrett wrote a concurrence questioning the viability of Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which limited claims of religious exemption. Yet, she declined to overrule it completely, writing, “but I am skeptical about swapping Smith’s categorical antidiscrimination approach for an equally categorical strict-scrutiny regime, particularly when this Court’s resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws and other First Amendment rights—like speech and assembly—has been much more nuanced.” This passage captures Barrett’s method on the court: intellectual curiosity balanced with institutional caution. Rather than utilizing the case to revolutionize Free Exercise doctrine, she opts for incrementalism in the name of preserving stability rather than ideological victories.

Barrett joined the majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, overturning Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a decision that instantly came to define her in the public view as a critical part of the Court’s most conservative, far-right block. Yet, her conduct after the decision seems to complicate this picture. Throughout subsequent abortion-related emergency appeals, Barrett has shown a reluctance to expand the reach of the ruling or to grant sweeping relief to states. In this sense, her silence seems to be strategic—it's an effort to shield the Court from further erosion of its legitimacy after Dobbs sparked national backlash.

In Moore v. Harper (2023), Barrett joined Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh in rejecting the “independent state legislature” theory; a theory that would have given state legislatures near-absolute power in regulating federal elections. The theory, which was embraced by some of Trump’s allies after the 2020 election, would have dramatically shifted the power over election law out of the judiciary’s oversight. The vote of Barrett would prove pivotal in preserving the balance of power between state and federal authority and serve as a rebuke to the legal theories advanced by those in Trump’s circles. 

Taken as an overarching narrative, the rulings reveal Justice Barrett to be an institutionalist who is attentive and concerned about the Court’s credibility and cautious of overreach. While Barrett often aligns with the conservative majority, she tends to temper its impulses, shaping opinions toward narrower holdings and defending the greater institution. Her conservatism, in simple terms, is procedural before it is political.

So, what kind of “conservative” is Amy Coney Barrett? The question stands important as the word itself evolves. Yet, in judicial philosophy, conservatism holds a much more historical definition. It can denote commitment to judicial restraint, fidelity to text, and respect for institutional continuity—traits that represent a direct foil to ideological zeal and judicial activism, regardless of its political leaning.

Barrett increasingly embodies an older institutional conservatism. Like her colleague Chief Justice Roberts, she believes that the authority of the Court depends on perceived neutrality and the integrity of its procedures. This philosophy does not preclude conservative outcomes, but insists that such outcomes arise out of disciplined reasoning rather than that of partisan motivation. Her textualism seems to be less an instrument of ideology than a constraint against judicial innovation. It is conservatism as a method, not an outcome.

ACB’s fidelity to method over outcome traces back to her years as a clerk under Justice Antonin Scalia. Working under the famous originalist exposed her to the rigor of textualism and the conviction that the meaning of the Constitution must be derived from its words, not the preferences of the judiciary. Yet, while Scalia’s conservative brand often came across as combative and rhetorically forceful, Barrett is quieter, less performative, and more judicial. She carries Scalia’s procedural discipline but tempers it with institutional sensitivity that Scalia often resisted. In this sense, she becomes both a continuation and a maturation of originalism. 

This specific orientation clearly differentiates Barrett from colleagues such as Justices Thomas and Alito, whose jurisprudence often seeks to reorient entire constitutional doctrines. Barrett’s opinions align her with the historic institutionalists of the Court, from Harlan and Frankfurter to Roberts today. At a time when the Court’s legitimacy faces profound public skepticism, her restraint may in fact be her most consequential form of conservatism. 

The trajectory of Justice Barrett illustrates a broader truth regarding American constitutional design: presidents can nominate justices, but they cannot control them. Lifetime tenure, professional identities, and the Court's institutional culture combine to erode political loyalty over time. Barrett’s independence is less an exception than a reaffirmation of this principle.

History serves as a rich mine of examples. Justice David Souter, appointed by George H. W. Bush, eventually became a reliable liberal vote. Chief Justice John Roberts, an appointee of the younger Bush, has repeatedly frustrated conservatives through cases upholding the Affordable Care Act and limiting challenges to executive agencies. Even Justice Neil Gorsuch, appointed by President Trump alongside Barrett, authored the majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), which extended Title VII protections to LGBTQ employees, a decision that was condemned by conservatives and hailed by progressives. 

Time and time again, institutional forces shape judicial behavior more than partisan influences. Once safely upon the bench, Justices find a new set of incentives before them: internal deliberations, stare decisis, and the gaze of history. The Justices themselves become custodians of the Court’s legitimacy, directly opposed to the ideological agency their appointing presidents desired. Thus, the development of Barrett reaffirms the American judicial system’s capacity to transcend politics.

Within this light, Barrett’s significance extends far beyond her individual record. She is a case study in the post-Trump redefinition of conservative jurisprudence. The Trump administration has sought to fuse the judiciary with partisan identity, framing judicial appointments as trophies of political maneuvering. Even so, Barrett’s conduct toward the court–measured, independent, and institutionally conscious suggests that this fusion has found limits. Her conservatism is not of the populist or nationalist variety that dominates the politics of today’s Republican party, but an older Madisonian kind, skeptical of power, mindful of its structures, and cautious of judicial activism from either direction. 

The aforementioned divergence highlights a critical question regarding the future of the legal conservatism movement: will it prioritize political alignment, or will it rediscover conservatism as a philosophy of restraint? Barrett is an example suggesting that the latter may have vitality and that SCOTUS’s legitimacy may depend on it.

Justice Barrett’s first years on the Supreme Court have defied even the most partisan expectations of her appointment to the bench. Though appointed by a deeply polarizing president, she has continued to show a willingness to temper the court’s ideological impulses in favor of the institution’s stability. This record illustrates that the Supreme Court, despite the numerous political pressures surrounding it, remains a place where constitutional structure can outlast the ambition of presidents.

If ACB’s trajectory continues, she may emerge with a legacy not of a partisan warrior but as a defining voice of a new conservative realism: one that prizes procedure, legitimacy, and restraint over the victory of ideological lines. In doing so, she reminds us that while presidents make the nominations, it is the Constitution, and only the Constitution, that ultimately claims justice.

Hayden Hradek is a freshman from the Ozarks of southwest Missouri studying Philosophy, Social Analysis and Research. He is a staff writer for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at hayden_hradek@brown.edu.

Emily Walsh is a sophomore from Minnesota studying Philosophy and International & Public Affairs. She is a staff editor for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at emily_m_walsh@brown.edu 

Luca Feng is a sophomore at Brown University, concentrating in Political Science and Chemical Engineering. He is a staff editor for the Brown Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at trevor_feng@brown.edu.